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Popular cultural policy:




Singaporean cultural policy is about censoring the media and maintaining social and politicol
control, while at the same time extracting economic value fram various aspects of the arts and
culture. While outlining (pre)existing cultural-policy positions, this poper looks brieffy at recent
policy frameworks in Singapore, namely Singapore 21 (Singapore 21 Committee, 1999) and
the Renaissance City Report (Ministry of Information and the Arts, 20000). It argues that these
statements aim to convince citizens to embrace sociocultural change for the good of the nation.
To ensure that these messages reach and engage citizens, the Singapore Govemment employs
a mass popularisation strategy mobilising popular cultural items-rnost notably national pop
songs and music video clips. As this poper will evince, the lyrics and mediated video images of
these popular national songs are not only powerful purveyor; of the myth of nationhood, but
essential tools of cultural policy with the immediate effect of remforcing the hegemony of the
economic and legitimising the political in Singapore.
1111111111111
200302394





INTRODUCTION: THE 'REALITY' OF SINGAPORE
T
his is one of the greatest strengths about
Singapore: its willingness to face reality
including the 9th of August... EveI)' year,
on this 9th August for many years ahead-how
many, I do not know-we will dedicate our -
selves anew to consolidate ourselves to survive;
and most important of all, to find an enduring
future for what we have built and what our for-
bears will build up. (Lee Kuan Yew, then Prime
Minister of Singapore, fir:;t National Day Rally
Speech, 1966, August 8)
On 8 August 1966, the eve of the first anniver-
sary of an independent Republic of Singapore,
then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew delivered the
inaugural National Day Rally Speech to the
nation'. Among other things, Lee recounted the
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Malaysia on 9 August 196S. The official reason for Singapore's reluctant
separation was Malaysia's unwillingness to embrace a 'Malaysian
Malaysia' agenda, where non-communalist politics and multiracial inte-
gration is paramount (Lee, 1965; see al~.o Lee, 1966). In short, Singa-
pore was to become what Malaysia would not be. In his Rally speech,
Lee reiterated his Government's social and cultural policy of multiracial-
ism-encompassing also the familiar elements of multilingualism, multi-
culturalism, and multireligiosity-which 'survives' to this day. Indeed,
Singapore's first National Day was filled with politically charged innuen-
does and the rhetoric of national survival.
Significantly, Lee forged Singapore's national 'reality' with his decree
that every 9 August would be set aside as a day of dedication. It is note-
worthy that Lee's original idea of a National Day had little to do with the
pomp and pageantry or the carnival elements of today's National Day
Parades (NDP)2. Indeed, the term 'celebration' was palpably omitted
from Lee's speech. The National Day Lee envisaged had a stern and
phlegmatic demeanour, akin to a memorial service to honour victims or
veterans of a war or tragedy. Lee's intention was to orchestrate the
invention of a State-defined Singaporean national culture-cum-identity
(see Velayuthum, 1995, p. 42). Although the precise shape and defini-
tion of being 'Singaporean' remains vague and contentious, itwas made
pointedly clear from the outset that it had to be distinct from Malaysian
culture and identity. Multiracialism as the refusal to privilege people
based on race and ethnicity thus became the founding-and founda-
tional----<:ultural policy of modern Singapore.
Singapore's National Day has always been a prime site for the
(re)articulation of national goals. It is an opportunity for the ruling
People Action Party (PAP) Government to announce and 'soft-sell' new
policy agendas. Despite the historical, political, and cultural gravity of
Singapore's National Day, few critical imights have been proffered on
the event, with the exception of journalistic reports and government
statements. Writers commenting on Singapore's approach to National
Day tend to focus on its grandeur, and the various nationalistic aspects
of the annual and epic National Day Parade (NDP)-the highlight of the
month-long celebration3-to the extent that it has become a cliche to
consider the parade a ritualised and stylised attempt at cultivating
nationalist sentiments, and thereby developing a habitus of the 'imag-
ined communities' of nationality (Anderson, 1983). Leong (l 999) analy-
ses the NDP as a commodity to be consumed by two fairly disparate
groups of Singaporeans: the 'believers' of the myth of the Singaporean
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84'nation' and the 'unbelievers'. The believers are (mostly) convinced that
Singapore is governed by the best possible bureaucrats and power-hold-
ers; the unbelievers are those citizens Leong describes as 'repressed
consumers', who prefer to find other (non-patriotic) modes of distrac-
tion. Devashayam (1990) makes a similar observation, highlighting the
significance of identity formation within the annual NDP, and the result-
ing (lack of) response from citizens.
Another approach is to treat the NDP as a media and/or mediatory
event. Lim's (1999) analysis of the live telecast of the 1993 NDP on
Singapore national television is a case In point. As Lim points out, the
media(ted) spectacle of the NDP is a powerful tool in engendering
public consumption of and 'staged' participation in the event.
Velayutham (1995) takes a slightly different approach, positioning the
NDP as a mediatory event aimed at publicising and negotiating the
differences, divisions, conflicts, and contradictions that result from
Singapore's multiracial multireligious, multilingual, and multicultural
national polity and cultural policies4• Velayutham notes that the NDP is
actively involved in processes of identity mediation and the manage-
ment of difference for 'the purpose of positioning the nation and the
character of its people' for the sake of economic progress (1995, p. iv).
This paper, while acknowledging the mediatory and other signifying
practices of the National Day Parade, will accentuate the Importance of
new populist or popularisation strategies adopted by the Singapore
Government in its annual planning and execution of recent National
Day celebrations. It will demonstrate that, while the date 9 August has
remained (since Lee Kuan Yew's dedication in 19(6), the elements, style,
and focus of the day have shifted.
If successfully implemented, the populari5ation of events and
symbols associated with Singapore's National Day has the potential to
change social and cultural attitudes. While listening to a speech deliv-
ered by the eloquent Lee Kuan Yew was popul21r in 1966, it would be
difficult to incite the same fervour and participation today. Likewise,
while past National Days emphasised political survival and nation build-
ing, recent National Days reflect the changing social, cultural, and polit-
ical demands of Singapore and Singaporeans. Nevertheless, there was-
and still is-a need to engage citizens in as many ways as possible. This
is where the cultural policy-cum-strategy of popularisation comes in. By
popularising national events, songs, and symbols, the nation becomes
socially, culturally, and aesthetically pleasing-even entertaining-to the
ordinary consumer-as-citizen, thus rendering the often arduous task of
communicating (especially unpopular) Governmental messages and/or
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atmosphere of celebration through the popularisation of national
events, songs, and symbols can also be perceived as a strategy of
engagement-where Singaporeans, especially the young and/or the
politically less-informed, would be incited to participate by internalising
the sights and sounds of 'nationhood'.
This paper considers Singapore's cultural policy by looking at the
National Day 2000 celebrations and the discourse of national songs. It
shows how Singapore's cultural policy i~, asserted and framed in and
through the promotion of entertainment, as well as through the popu-
larisation of media and cultural products. It takes a particular interest in
the audio-visual making-and remaking--of a few well-known national
songs (Ministry of Information &: the Arts [MIA], 2000). The commis-
sioning and composing of heart-warming national songs has, arguably,
emerged as one of the most powerful and successful popularisation
strategies adopted by the Singapore Government. By analysing the lyrics
of and music-video images portrayed by these national songs, this paper
attempts to gather or make sense of Singapore's cultural policy and
direction.
POPULAR(ISING) CULTURE AS/AND POLlC1r
'Cultural displays can be used to say new things, foster new under-
standings, promote old ones, valorize and legitimate stances by govern-
ments, peoples, or communities' (Kurin, 1995, p. 12). Over the 36-year
history of independent Singapore, National Day organisers and their
respective committees have tried and tested various ways of engaging
and inducing nationalistic pride. Visually appealing items-such as laser
shows, fireworks, military hardware displays and stunts, free-falling
commandos, multi-coloured floats, mass flashcards, and other cultural
displays-have become a regular part of the National Day Parade
program. The mobilisation of a celebratory mood and the creation of an
atmosphere of fun are equally (if not more) important to incite partici-
pation at events such as parades and carnivals. Party atmosphere, as I
observeds, was a key component in the National Day 2000 celebrations.
A national carnival-'Carnival@TheBay'-aimed at the young and tech-
savvy sections of the population, was held at Marina South, 44 hectares
of reclaimed land touted as Singapore's new downtown of the 21 st
century (Andrianie, 2000a, 2000b). Desi<jned as a theme park, one of
the highlights of the four-day-Iong carnival was a group of mini-villages
showcasing the culture, handicratts, dances, and, indeed, the (folk)
music of Singapore's four official ethnic categorisations: Chinese, Malay,
Indian, and Eurasian (or 'others'). These mini-villages were constructed
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tance for Singapore's political and cultural stability in the new millen-
nium. Also featured were four large figurines, once again representing
the four ethnic groups, in their 'traditional' costumes. (These figurines
were to make their grand appearance at a mass display at the National
Day Parade 2000.) NDP 2000 was themed 'Together, We Make The
Difference', mirroring the title of Singapore's latest vision statement
Singapore 26. Described as 'mass entertainment' (Chng, 2000a) and 'the
grandest bash yet' (Andrianie, 2000c, p. 1), NDP 2000 had an unprece-
dented focus on fun, partying, and participation. Spectators were urged
to cheer, sing out loud, wave little national fla9s, blaze their torches,
drum a rhythm in unison (on their hand-held drum kit), even scream, as
a demonstration of their love for Singapore'.
Far from merely symbolising the nation's survival, 9 August has
become possibly the most popular social and cultural event in Singa-
pore. Its popularity is comparable to a sell-out rock-music concert, with
aspiring spectators having to queue overnight, often for more than 12
hours, just to obtain two tickets to the big parade ('Camping overnight
for NDP tickets', 2000). Those unable to obtain tickets have to be
content with live telecast or webcast (options made available since the
1994 National Day) (Teo, 2000). Not only is the NDP webcast a power-
ful demonstration of Singapore's technological competence and readi-
ness for the new information economy, it also enables the transcen-
dence of the traditional domestic sphere of a national audience to a
greater global audience, reaching out especially to Singaporeans resid-
ing abroad (Lim, 1999, p. 142).
While it is undeniable that the NDP is a great source of entertain-
ment, with the live telecast consistently attaining one of the highest
free-to-air television ratings, the degree of national pride instilled, if at all
quantifiable, remains somewhat questionable. l.eong (1999) suggests
that, for some, the motive for attending the parade is the free parade kit
containing a wide range of goodies and discount vouchers (p. 11). On
8 August 2000, The Straits Times daily reported that the much-coveted
tickets to the NDP were being sold on the Internet for amounts ranging
from S$50 to S$250 or more per ticket (Arshad, 2000, p. 1), buyers
rationalising the 'black market' price as a 'token of appreciation' for long
hours of queuing.
Like any other forms of popular culture, Singapore's National Day-
the parade, as well as the event in general-is a discursive site of mean-
ing-making and contestation. It is ideally suited for debates surrounding
the imaginary status of the 'nation', as exemplified in issues pertaining
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ism, and so on. For example, as National Day approaches every year, the
national press finds itself inundated with letters about the representation
of the national flag and whether displaying it outside the home signifies
patriotism (Leong, 1999, p. 12). Debates of such nature are always
polarised, even futile, some believing that displaying the flag demon-
strates national pride ('Let us show the flag', 2000), others arguing that
true patriotism needs no such public showcasing ('Flag not a must',
2000). Of course, there are yet others who are Simply unperturbed or
unmoved, fitting neatly into Leong's aforementioned category of 'unbe-
Iievers'. The displaying of a national flag, however, is circumscribed by
the rules and regulations governing its public display and use. Accord-
ing to a Ministry of Information and the Arts memorandum, flags may
be displayed only between 1 August and 31 August every year, and each
flag must be treated respectfully:
The flag must also be washed and dried indoors separately, and not
together with other laundry. If it is torn or worn-out, it should be disposed
of by packing it in asealed;black trash bag. Or it can be handed to the
nearest Residents' Committee or community centre for disposal. ('Raise
the flag with pride', 2000)
With such clear and rigid instructions, Singapore's notoriety as awell-
regulated---<lr perhaps over-regulated-'nanny' state is made manifest
here. While it remains uncertain whether or not the abovementioned
rules pertaining to the flag are properly adhered to, what is interesting
is the way in which ideas and meanings al-e contested in Singapore. The
issue as of whether or not to display the national flag offers a glimpse of
the PAP Government's highly measured but successful approach to
policy administration, demonstrated in and by its exactitude in rule-
making. At the end of the day, strange'ly enough, most Singaporean
homes display the national flag and other ornaments-but whether or
not this is done proudly or perfunctorily as an annual decorative ritual
remains a moot point.
The host of events and such debates that characterise Singapore's
National Day makes it an ideal site for the articulation of cultural policy,
understood here as the 'clash of ideas, institutional struggles and power
relations in the production and circulation of symbolic meanings'
(McGuigan, 1996, p. 1)8. Singaporean authorities are aware of the need
to constantly produce and circulate new symbolic meanings with the
aim of maintaining political power through the control, or, to use
Foucault's (1977) term, the 'disciplining', of its citizens. In other words,
cultural policy in Singapore is predicated upon the notion of controlling
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~urin (1995) calls the capturing of 'broad public sentiments'. A crucial
)art of this control and shaping of public sentiments is getting 5inga-
)oreans to imagine themselves as disciplined, law-abiding, and patriotic
citizens-not of the present alone, but of the future. According to Birch
1993), power-wielders in Singapore are eager to maintain 'reality-
nyths which position Singapore as a society always in danger, always
lttempting by hard work and sacrifice to avert some future crisis' (p. 3).
:urther, Birch (1996) also makes clear that cultural policy in Singapore is
eally astrategic policy of control, part of an overall economic and devel-
)pmental policy insisting upon political and social stability at all costs.
ndeed, Singaporean geographer Kong (2000a) points out that in 'prag-
natic' Singapore, the major motivation behind cultural policy is
,conomic(s)9. After all, as Kong explicates, the economic works in and
hrough the sociocultural (p. 410). Therefore, as long as Singaporeans
)erceive culture and cultural policy from an economic standpoint, the
~overnment has little to fear in terms of policy non-compliance or elec-
oral backlash at the polls.
Yet the emergence of younger, better-educated,. and more globalised
niddle-c1ass Singaporeans means that the Government can no longer
Teat the present population in the paternalistic ways of the past. Like
arge multinationals and conglomerates, bureaucracies around the
"orld are now having to behave like good corporate citizens and take
Jublic relations and opinion seriously. Singapore is no exception. In
'ecent years, the Prime Minister has used the National Day Rally speech
:0 flesh out new ideas and prospective policy directions. This enables the
::;overnment to prepare citizens for policy changes,. and to gauge public
)pinion sufficiently early so as to make an informed decision on their
lext political move.
In 1999, Singapore 27: Tagether We Make the Difference, Singapore's
vision splendid' of the 21 st century, was unveiled. The Singapare 27
/ision, which aims to strengthen 'the intangibles of society-social cohe-
;ion, political stability and the collective will, values and attitudes of a
Jeople' (Singapore 21 Committee, 1999), is first an exercise in
~conomic and political expedience. Concomitantly, due to its call for
Singaporeans to embrace attitudinal change, it is also, by extension, a
itatement of cultural policy. The Government's desire to increase the
.nflow of white-collar workers from overseas to boost Singapore's
:ompetitiveness in the new information- and knowledge-based econ-
omy provides the best illustration of Singapore 27 's agenda for sociocul-
tural change. The concept of Singapore 27 was first articulated by Prime
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Global City, Best Home (Goh, 1997). Among other things, Goh stated
that just as there are many Singaporeans living and working overseas,
there is also a need for Singapore to 'gather talent and make Singapore
a cosmopolitan city' the like of London, New York, and Hong Kong (pp.
28-39). Goh foreshadowed the imminence of a major shift in Govern-
ment policy. This simple speech was to radically affect Government
ministries and departments, including those managing the arts and
cultural portfolios. Fewer than two months after Goh's speech, the
project of Singapore 21 was launched to look into immigration policy,
global labour arrangements, and other equally pertinent national issues
(Fernandez, 1997, p. 1).
Although the plan to inject foreign talent into Singapore is a sound
economic policy, the prospect of Singaporean citizens losing their 'rice-
bowls' to foreigners did not go down too well. In short, it was an unpop-
ular policy-xenophobia, ignorance, as well as false patriotism soon
began to take over. The Government had to manage such overtly
nationalistic sentiments not by withdrawing or reversing the policy, but
by assuring every Singaporean that they would be well looked after in
an increasingly global era. There was, in other words, a need to 'popu-
larise' the policy position by mobilising the mass media, the press,
Government departments, statutory authorities, and other public appa-
ratuses to speak favourably on the issue. Prime Minister Goh then gave
greater prominence to the issue of 'gathering talent' at the next
National Day Rally Speech in 1998. This time, however, the term
'foreign talent' was used to remove possible traces of ambiguity. In a
clear attempt at assuaging public discontentment, Goh (1998) argued:
For while we attract foreign talent and welcome foreigners who contribute
to our economy, Singapore must always have a hard core of citizens,
cohesive and totally committed to the country, around whom we can
attract other talent and build anation.
As Government departments had ample time and feedback to
prepare an inclusive policy and vision statement, the final outcome,
presented as the 'five broad pillars' of Singapore 21, was thus able to
embody and alleviate some key concernslO. The five pillars, designed to
encompass an extensive range of issues and concerns, are as follows:
1. Every Singaporean Matters
2. Strong Families: Our Foundation ancl Our Future
3. Opportunities for All
4. The Singapore Heartbeat
5. Active Citizens: Making a Difference to Society.
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policy is well liked or fully supported by citizens. Rather, the strategy of
popularisation aims primarily to minimise opposition and attain, if
necessary, 'blind' (or muted) acceptance of the Government's perfor-
mance. The 'struggle for the popular', according to Bennett's (1983)
analysis of Marxist cultural politics in Britain, is conceived as one of 'seek-
ing to displace current and actual forms of "the people'us culture with a
different content', in the hope that 'the people' might eventually be led
to appropriate the new content, and therefore culture, as their own (p.
17). In other words, popularisation is used as a strategy to manage
sociocultural change by attaining political legitimacy and public
endorsement not necessarily for the betterment of society, but for the
maintenance of power. With immense power to define the future mould
of Singapore's citizenry regarding the 'foreign talent' issue, and to
construct the terms on which the people should be mobilised, Singapore
21 is (undoubtedly) a useful popularisation strategy of the PAP Govern-
ment in enacting and enforcing a cultural policy of control.
The next section of this paper extends the notion of popularisation
by looking at the employment and deployment of national songs within
Singapore. Rather than perceive national songs as peripheral or
/ mundane accompaniments to the annual National Day Parade and key
celebratory events such as the National Day Rally, I raise the (symbolic)
profile of national songs by positioning them as tools of cultural policy,
thus political strategies and 'realities' in their own right. In so doing, I
locate the populist aspects of Singapore's popularisation strategy in
exacting further cultural and ideological control over its citizenry (Birch,
1996; Lee I:< Birch, 2000).
NATIONAL SONGS: CULTURAL POLICY (PER)FORMED
According to Leong (1999), the admission into the NDP of popular
cultural items such as music, dance performances, and pop songs since
the mid-1980s has incited greater participation (p. 4). But perhaps the
most participatory element of National Day celebrations is the mass
singing of national songs (along with the national anthem), which
Leong describes as a clear 'populist strategy to engage the masses' (p.
4). Chng (2000a) echoes Leong when she notes most cogently in her
preview of NDP 2000 that
the build-up for the NDP and National Day starts with the latest Singapore
[national] song played over the TV and radio in July. There is also aSing
Singapore Committee... to discover and promote original songs written
by Singaporeans. Songs such as 'Count on Me Singapore' and 'Stand Up
Popular cultural policy
91for Singapore' have become NDP classics. Always sung at the NDP, they
never fail to bring forth a swelling of national pride even for viewers at
home. (p. 18)
Some of the better-known national songs, or 'NDP classics', include
• There's a Part for Everyone (1984)-part of the centralised and collec-
tive effort by the Singapore Government to launch Singapore's 'total
defence' foreign policy
• Stand Up far Singapore (1985; revised 2000)
• Count on me, Singapore (1986; revised 2000)
• We are Singapore (1987; revised 2000)
• One People, One Nation, One Singapore (1989)
• Home (1998)
• Together (1999)-to launch the Singapore 21 vision statement
• Shine On Me (2000)
• Majulah Singapura (1959; revised 2001 )-Singapore's national
anthem
These national songs are usually written and performed by well-
known or identifiable local artists or television/radio celebrities. The
songs-and the artists, who are really more interested in boosting their
public persona and hence net economic worth-receive extensive
publicity over local television, radio, and the Internet through August
(and sometimes July). In addition, these songs are generously commis-
sioned and officially endorsed by the Ministry of Information and the
Arts. As a result, national songs have become powerful mediators in the
relay of nationalist messages and images to the Singaporean citizenry. In
recent years, not only are these songs aired over the dominant local
mass media, they are recorded in digital format, distributed, and sold in
various formats, including compact disc (CD), video-CD (VCD), and
digital versatile disc (DVD). Examples of such recordings include NDP
33:Remembering Our Past 33 National Day Parades (1999, VCD format);
My Home, Singapore: Documentaries and Music Videos on Singapore
(1999, VCD format); and, Singapore: One Voice (2000, VCD &: DVD
formats), which boasts a complete collection of national songs accom-
panied by music video clips. With these recordings, Singaporeans can
not only have their favourite national songs 'on-demand', they are able
to screen images of National Day and the nation within the private
domain of their living rooms. The notion of the NDP as a 'mediatory'
event, as advanced by Velayutham (1995), thus takes on an added
cultural dimension.
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one that traverses both time (e.g., 'NDP classics') and space, since the
live telecasting of the NDP reaches out to media audiences, whether
they are watching at home or in attendance at the Padang (field), the
parade ground outside Singapore's City Hall. To ensure that home view-
ers get the best of a live telecast parade, lyrics are subtitled in real time,
encouraging participation karaoke fashion (Urn, 1999, p. 133). More
recently, the lyrics, soundtrack, and video clips of most national songs
have also been lodged on the Sing Singapore website". This website
viVidly captures the essence and imagination of Singapore's high-tech
status, allowing listeners to download any national song in MP3 format
to their personal computers or portable music devices, and to download
any music video clip. Any accompanying music video may also be
downloaded for future viewing. The National Arts Council, the statutory
body tasked with the responsibility of managing these national songs,
ensures that they are widely and easily accessible to Singaporeans both
at home and away-one of the most, if not the most, basic aspect of
promotion and popularisation of the nation.
Engel (1866), in his landmark study into the background and tradi-
tions of 'national music', contends that the form and spirit of popular
music compositions vary greatly in different nations. From an anthropo-
logical point of view, the study of national music and songs is useful
because it illustrates the distinctive characteristics of various countries
and their people (see also Williams, 1963). Engel notes the significance
of national songs in marking out or promotin!J a particular period or
event in a nation's history (p. 12). According to Engel,
the term National Music implies that music, which, appertaining to a
nation or tribe, whose individual emotions and passions it expresses,
exhibits certain peculiarities more or less characteristic, which distin -
guishes it from the music of any other nation or tribe. (p. 1)12
Engel also submits that the more a nation advances in civilisation and
self-esteem, the more it seeks to symbolise and E'xpress its feelings about
itself through popular songs, folklore, and other monuments. Engel's
observation is cogently reflected in Singapore's Renaissance City Report
(MIA, 2000), a Government report outlining the strategic steps neces-
sary to revitalise Singapore's arts and cultural industry. On a global scale,
Singapore aims to become, as the title of the report suggests, a premier
'renaissance City' of the arts of the 21 st centu~l, the like of New York,
London, Melbourne, and Glasgow. On a local lEvel, however, the aim is
to 'strengthen the Singapore Heartbeat', or its collective identity,
through the expression of 'Singapore stories in culture and the arts'
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lyrics and themes tend to focus on the distinctive aspects-the 'pecu-
liarities'-of Singaporean culture and. identity. In this way, the discourse
of national songs becomes a part of the physical, social, cultural, and
political 'renaissance', or (re)construction" of Singapore's nationhood.
The emotive and heart-warming appeal of the national song Home
(1998), for instance, attempts to capture the peculiarities and other
intangible aspects of being Singaporean. Written by reputable singer-
songwriter Dick Lee and performed by local pop-singer Kit Chan, this
ballad suggests that Singapore is 'home' wherever one chooses to go13:
Wherever I am feeling low, I look around me and Iknow
There's aplace that will stay within me, wherever I may choose to go
Iwill always recall the city, know every street and shore
Sail down the river which brings us life, winding through my Singapore
Chorus:
This is home truly, where I know I must be
Where my dreams wait for me, where that river always flows
This is home surely, as my senses tell me
This is where I won't be alone, for this is where I know it's home
When there are troubles to go through, we'll find away to start anew
There is comfort in the knowledge that home's about its people too
So we'll build our dreams together, just like we've done before
just like the river which brings us life, there'lI always be Singapore
In this song, 'home' is both a metaphysical construct as well as a
geographical reality: a place that stays 'within' one's 'senses' and, at the
same time, an urbanised 'city' with 'its people', a flowing 'river', 'street
and shore', and so on. In short, the song suggests that Singaporean
identity does not simply consist of rooting oneself geophysically on
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pore, for it is where 'my dream5 wait for me, where the river always
flows'.
The lyrics of Home reinforce the vision of Singapore 27, which, among
other agendas, calls for Singaporeans to become global in their outlook.
It is thus consistent with Prime Minister Goh's call to encourage 'foreign
talent' and thus embrace cosmopolitanism, returning Singapore to its
status as a truly vibrant global city. While not overtly expressing it, the
song also issues a call to skilled Singaporeans residing or working over-
seas to return to the 'streets and shore' of homeland Singapore.
Concomitantly, those Singaporeans who do not venture abroad,
euphemistically referred to by Singapore's politicians and mass media as
the 'heartlanders', are also assured of their place in a society that is
'about its people too'. Home, in effect, popularises and performs Singa-
pore's current cultural policy statement as exemplified in Singapore 27.
Putting the ideals of the government into a national song notonly enter-
tains, it also fulfils erstwhile aims to further root Singaporeans-near and
far-to their 'imagined' beloved nation, while signalling and preparing
its citizens for further cultural (policy) changes ahead. In this case, one
can expect the city, street, and shore to be filled with 01001-, or more
appropriately 'new', overseas-born and/or foreign-trained 'Singapore-
ans'. A 'patriotic' Singaporean, one who calls Singapore 'home', must
therefore 'go through troubles' and accept changes graciously, or be left
behind-if not economically, then socioculturally. Such is the new 'real-
ity' of Singapore envisioned in Singapore 27.
The remake of the 1985 'NDP classic' Stand Up For Singapore by the
Ministry of Information and the Arts for the National Day 2000 celebra-
tions is, perhaps, the most blatant attempt at popularising Singapore as
a 'hip' and 'cool' cosmopolitan city. It is also the most illustrative-the
music video clip, made to accompany the new version, was a radical
departure from convention. While the original clip of the song is
straight-laced and austere in its message of how and why one ought to
'stand up' and support Singapore, the new version is the opposite. Ener-
getic and youthful in every aspect, the new clip was certain to make
heads turn. Whether this was done in disdain or admiration is not so
important; its ability to signify and portray a culturally vibrant city-state
is more lasting and potent. In Stand Up For Singapore (2000), the four
lead singers (two males and two female, in their late-teens to mid-twen-
ties) dance in the subway station, on the streets, in parklands, on the
rooftop of a skyscraper, and in and on othel' aesthetic locales, to a
jazzed-up version of the song. The clip (over)emphasises the vigour of
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unkempt hair. This caricature is somewhat shocking, recalling the well-
circulated rumour that long-haired men entering Singapore had their
hair cut by customs officers. Furthermore, to this day, males in the civil
service, and in many other Singaporean organisations, are not permit-
ted long hair at work. This clip indicates that, among other things, the
authorities are now prepared to overlook such rules-dated and less
relevant from an economic standpoint (Kong, 2000a). The vision is that
the new economy demands entrepreneurial and artistic creativity; by
showing that Singaporeans are able to loosen up, foreign 'talent' may
be persuaded to establish themselves in the country. (The closing
sequence of the video depicts a group of police officers, military person-
nel, and other uniformed staff joining the lead singers in jumping and
dancing to the music and beat. It is equally unfathomable. One could
mistakenly think that the song was entitled 'Jump for Singapore'!)
Stand Up For Singapore (2000) best exemplifies the Government's
popularisation strategy: not only does this rendition debunk many of the
myths associated with Singapore, it is successful insofar as it promotes
Singapore as a truly progressive city. It also didactically imparts this new
image to the younger generation of Singaporeans-many of whom risk
defecting to the category of 'unbelievers' (Leong, 1999)-clearly the
prime target audience of this national song and video campaign. The
popularisation of Singapore as young, energetic, (pro)active, Vibrant,
and 'cool' aims to displace the perceptions of Singapore as a sterile city-
state of boring, econocentric leaders and humourless people. Through
the gradual perfection of this popularisation strategy, Singapore's
cultural policy of control to achieve rapid economic growth and devel-
opment is no longer visibly or overtly enforced-becau,se, after all, the
material fruits of economic success are openly manifested. Instead, citi-
zens are urged to actively participate and support (thus legitimising) the
State's panoramic vision, whether this comes in the form of an NDP
speech, Singapore 21 blueprint (Singapore 21 Committee, 1999), or
Renaissance City Report (MIA, 2000a). Finally, popularising Singapore is
about attaining political legitimacy and longevity for the ruling party. As
Kong (2000a) elucidates:
The ultimate concern is to develop in Singaporeans alove for their coun-
try, asense of patriotism, and awillingness to support the ruling elite who
have led the country through the short years since independence to
tremendous development. (p. 418)
In this regard, 'reality' has not really changed.
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The PAP Government recognises that popularising Singapore
through parades, carnivals, national songs, and other modes of enter-
tainment constitutes an extremely effective means of mobilising citizens
to support Government-led initiatives and polid~s. As discursive symbols
of nationhood, the consumption of these popular cultural items has the
potential to raise public consciousness regarding the framing of a
communitarian culture and national identity-·a noble agenda that is
likely to find little resistance (Chua, 1995). As a result, the popularisation
of national songs, for instance, a project that began in the 1980s, inten-
sified in the late 1990s, and is set to continue into the 2000s.
The Government has pumped in large sums to commission the audio
and video production of new songs. In typically Singaporean fashion,
the older favourites, including Stand Up For Singapore, have undergone
major revamps, with new arrangements and innovative new music
video clips made to captivate, and capture, new audiences14. In 2001,
the much-revered national anthem Majulah Singapura was revamped at
a cost of 5$200,000, making it 'more accessible to all Singaporeans'
(MIA, 2001 )'s:
[rhe] new recording of the National Anthem, Majulah Singapura, with a
grander and more inspiring arrangement, is set to become more populor
with Singoporeons. The new recording also comes with a revised English
translation of the lyrics so that the meaning of the Anthem can be better
understood. (emphasis added)
Like other national songs, the new version of the national anthem
comes complete with its own music video and music score sheets. In
addition, to ensure that the anthem becomes 'more popular' with all
Singaporeans, seven different versions of the anthem, including orches-
tral, choir/solo, and piano, have been recorded l;or teaching and singing
purposes (see Tan, 2001 a, 2001 b).
The popularisation of the national anthem fulfils two objectives. First,
the song has been given a slower tempo and transposed down a tone
from the key of G to Fto make it easier for people to sing. Children, who
are required to sing the anthem at school assernbly every morning, are
thus able to reach the notes comfortably and, hopefully, be moved by
it. The second, and arguably more pertinent, objective is that a revised
English translation of the lyrics has also been produced. As Birch (1993)
observes, while most are able to sing the son9 'with pride', very few
actually understand what the Malay lyrics mean (p. 1). Singapore's
desire to spurn all things Malaysian means that it is important to remedy
this language barrier not by teaching conversational Malay, but by trans-
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lah Singapura, or 'Onward Singapore', symbolises and celebrates Singa-
pore's new-found freedom-first from British-colonial rule, then from
Malay/sian ethnic dominance. (The 'reality' of 9 August is thus embed-
ded within the discourse of national songs and cultural policy.)
The popularisation of the nation in celebrations and in the singing of
both national songs and the national anthem is a strategy not only for
the long-term evocation and sustenance of national pride, but also for
immediate effect-in reinforcing the hegemony of the economic and
the political. While new policy statements and strategies may be devised
from time to time, the aim of producing and/or maintaining docile but
economically useful and politically comp",.nt citizens remains the zeit-
geist of cultural policy in Singapore.
NOTES
1. The Prime Minister's annual National Day Rally speech, resembling
the presidential State of the Union Address in the US, is continued to
this day. Unlike the first rally speech (1966), which was held on the
eve of National Day, the rally speech of today marks the close of
Singapore's National Day celebrations.
2. The first National Day Parade was aptly titled the 'First Indepen-
dence Anniversary ParadE=' (Chng, 2000a, p. 17).
3. See Chng's (2000b) preview of National Day Parade 2000, also
dubbed 'The Millennium Parade'.
4. For further reading on the politics and 'disciplining' of language,
racial, and cultural difference in Singapore, see Puroshotam (1998).
5. I attended the National Day Parade 2000 and visited the Marina
South 'Carnival@TheBay' event in August 2000. (For more informa-
tion on NDP 2000, see the souvenir programme National Day Parade
2000.)
6. It is worth noting that the theme of NDP 1999 was similar: 'Our
People: Together, We Make The Difference'. The decision to replicate
the theme suggests that the Government wanted sustained
emphases on the vision and agenda spelled out in Singapore 27.
7. NDP spectators in the Viewing gallery are usually given kits contain-
ing baseball caps, sponsored snacks, drinks, goodies, and gadgets-
flags, torches, and drum kits for the spectator to use during partici-
pation items and other segments of the mass displays. See Chng
(2000a) and Leong (1999, p. 11).
8. The study of 'cultural policy' comes in variants, with some using the
term to refer to museum and arts administration (see Bennett, 1995,
1998; DiMaggio, 1986), and others linking culture with the econ-
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98omy to form 'cultural economic policy' (see Kong, 2000a, 2000b). In
this paper, I approach culture and cultural policy from a broad
perspective, that is, as a means of underst21nding the Singaporean
way of life, and how it is framed, controlled, and governed.
9. See Chapter 3 of Chua (1995) for an explanation and critical assess-
ment of the PAP Government's employment of the ideology of prag-
matism.
10. I do not imply here that Singapore 27 was a wholly successful exer-
cise in public consultation and consensus-seeking. Although Singa-
pore 27 has been couched as a large-scale consultative exercise
involving some 6,000 Singaporeans, many views and comments
were conveniently overlooked, both before and after the exercise.
For a deeper understanding/analysis of Singapore 27, read the vision
in its entirety and/or see Lee (2001, 2002).
11. Sing Singapore was introduced by the Ministry of Information and
the Arts in 1988to promote national bonding through group singing
of national songs. In 1995, the National Arts Council took over the
organisation of the Sing Singapore project. At the time of revising this
paper (September 2002), the website (http://www.singsingapore.
org.sg/) featured a total of 23 songs in different moods and styles.
Instrumental versions may also be downloaded for sing-along
sessions karaoke fashion.
12. The use of the term 'national music' covers a whole range of musi-
cal types, including Volksmusik (folk music), popular music, songs,
tunes, anthems, various musical performances, and instruments, etc.
These terms are used somewhat interchangeably in this paper.
13. For further reading on the works and 'new Asian' appeal of Dick
Lee, see Wee (1996).
14. Other national songs revamped and re-released in 2000 include
Count on me, Singapore and We are Singapore (Singapore: One Voice,
2000).
15. The original Majulah Singapura was composed by the late Zubir
Said in 1957. It debuted in 1959 and was adopted as Singapore's
national anthem in 1965.
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